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IN 1 _ UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL H. SUHR, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under Utah 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992), providing fox jurisdiction in 
the couiw of appeals over cases transferred from the Supreme 
Court, Jurisdiction of this appeal was conferred on the Supreme 
Court by Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(j) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
fr- jury's finding that the steer entered the highway through 
either of two alleged defects in the adjacent fence and thus that 
UDOT's negligence proximately caused Suhr's injuries. 
Standard of Review: The denial of a motion for judgment 
no* thstanding the verdict based on insufficiency of the 
eviaence is reviewed for correctness, applying the same standard 
as the trial court: whether, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, there is competent evidence to 
support it. In challenging such a denial, the appellant must 
Case No. 920218-CA 
Prioritv No. 16 
marshall all of the evidence supporting the verdict and show that 
reasonable people would not conclude that the evidence supports 
the verdict. Hodges v. Gibson Products Co.. 811 P.2d 151, 156 
(Utah 1991); Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17-18 (Utah 1988); 
King v. Fereday. 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the First 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Frank L. Gunnell 
presiding, upon a jury verdict, awarding $118,814.70 in damages 
to the plaintiff-appellee Suhr against the defendant-appellant 
UDOT for property damage and personal injuries sustained by Suhr 
when his semi-truck hit a steer on an interstate highway, 
allegedly as a result of UDOT's negligent maintenance of the 
fence bordering the highway. 
Course of the Proceedings & Disposition Below 
A jury trial was held from December 17 - 20, 1991. At 
the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, UDOT moved for a directed 
verdict. The court denied the motion and submitted the case to 
the jury. By special verdict, the jury found UDOT 85% at fault 
and Suhr 15% at fault for the accident and resulting injuries. 
The jury awarded special damages of $83,860 and general damages 
of $50,000, for a total of $133,860. 
On January 7, 1992, after deducting for the 
2 
contributory negligence and adding pre-judgment interest and 
costs, the court entered a judgment on the verdict for 
$118,814.70. UDOT had moved for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict on December 30, 1992. On January 21, 1992, the court 
denied the motion. UDOT filed its notice of appeal on January 
30, 1992. 
Statement of the Facts 
The following facts are recited in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict, marshalling all of the evidence in 
support of the verdict. 
On November 8, 1988, plaintiff-appellee Michael H. Suhr 
was driving a semi-truck nortl^ound or "r.terstate 84 in Box Elder 
County near the Utah-Idaho border when his truck hit an 800 pound 
steer that was standing in the outside lane. Suhr's truck was 
damaged and he sustained personal injuries in the accident. 
At the point of the accident, the highway was bordered 
on both sides by a pasture, which was separated from the highway 
by wire fencing. The highway consisted of two lanes in each 
direction, divided by a wide center median. Just north of the 
accident site, a box culvert ran underneath and perpendicular to 
the highway, allowing cattle and other farm traffic to travel 
from one side of the highway to another. Where it crossed the 
median strip, the culvert was bordered on both sides by fencing. 
(For a general layout of the highway, see Plaintiff's Exhibit 
Nos. 5, 4 and 13, photocopies of which are attached as Addendum 
2.) All of the fencing was maintained by UDOT. 
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Suhr filed a complaint alleging that UDOT had 
negligently designed and maintained the fencing and that this 
negligence was the proximate cause of the steer's entry onto the 
highway and thus the accident. On UDOT's motion, the "livestock 
owner or operatorff was also included on the special verdict form 
for purposes of assessing fault. R. 332. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, 
the evidence adduced at trial showed that there were two 
defective areas in the fence near the accident site: an area on 
the east (northbound) side of the highway, where water erosion 
had created a gap beneath the fence, and an area in the median 
section of the culvert where a combination of sagging of the 
fence wires and accretion of the ground level shortened the fence 
to 36 inches from the standard 52 inch height. 
Tom Wilcock testified that he went to the scene of the 
accident the day after it occurred and identified the steer as 
one of his own. Tr. 320.1 Wilcock testified that he had been 
operating the ranch next to the highway since April 1982 and that 
he kept cattle in the pasture on the northbound side of the 
highway 30 to 40 days a year in the fall before snowfall. Tr. 
318. He testified that cattle liked to stick their heads in the 
gap underneath the fence to rub their necks, and that the bottom 
of the fence was bent outward at the gap. Tr. 335. According to 
Wilcock, it was "possible" for an animal the size of the steer 
1Because the trial transcript was paginated separately from 
the remaining trial record, it is referred to as "Tr. ". 
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involved in the collision to have gone under the fence at the 
location of the gap, Tr. 336. Wilcock stated that in his 
opinion it was also possible for a steer to leap over the 
shortened fence in the median section of the culvert. Id. He 
testified that there was a gate on the southbound side of the 
culvert that was closed at the time of the accident. Tr. 331. 
Suhr called Clinton Burtf a rancher of over 40 years of 
experience, as an expert witness. Burt had never seen the 
accident site, but testified hypothetically that it was 
"possible" for an 800 pound steer to work its way under a 20 inch 
clearance between the ground and a field fence. Tr. 359. Burt 
alL :estified that he "imagined" th~: an 800 pound steer could 
jump over a 36 inch high fence "if there was no other place to 
go. It would have to be kind of boxed in." Tr. 360. According 
to Burt, cattle get nervous when boxed in and can also be 
"spooked" by noises. Tr. 362-363. 
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Paul Stephens investigated 
the accident on the night it occurred and the following day. He 
testified that "[i]t is possible, if that fence was up like knee 
high, a steer of that size . . . might be able to push their way 
underneath and traverse through it." Tr. 86. 
There was no direct evidence, however, that the steer 
actually did enter the highway through either of the two 
defective areas in the fence. To the contrary, Trooper Stephens, 
who had 30 years of experience with livestock, testified that he 
checked the fence on both sides of the highway and saw no place 
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where a steer could have entered the highway. Tr. 79-82. He 
testified that he did not measure the gap# that it "did not 
appear to be a problem area# and that lf[i]f I would have had any 
indication at all that a steer had gone under the particular 
portion of the fence I would have been alerted to it." Tr. 85-
86. He testified that he saw no displacement of the vegetation 
near the gap, no dig marks, no cow droppings, no hair on the 
fence, no scratches on the steer's hide, or any other sign that 
the steer entered the highway through the gap. Tr. 94-96. 
Similarly, Rodney Arbon, a UDOT employee responsible 
for maintaining the fence, inspected the fence on both sides of 
the highway for at least a mile in either direction from the 
accident site, and saw no place where the steer could have 
entered the highway. Tr. 172-73. Arbon testified that the gap 
between the bottom of the fence and the ground was actually only 
2 to 3 inches, although the deepest point of the eroded area, 
which was on the far side of the fence from the highway, was 16 
inches. Tr. 141-145, 197. 
The only other evidence of the actual dimensions of the 
gap was photographs taken in the spring following the accident. 
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 18, 19 & 20, photocopies of which 
are attached as Addendum 3.) Tr. 302-303. Although the 
photographs were admitted into evidence on Suhr's motion, Suhr 
argued in closing that because the view of the gap in the 
photographs was partially obstructed by vegetation and the angle 
from which they were taken, their probative value was limited. 
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Tr. 651. 
At the same time, unrebutted evidence showed that the 
steer could have entered the highway by some other means. Arbon 
testified that, at the time of the collision, Wilcock had cattle 
in two other pastures in the vicinity of the accident. Tr. 170-
75. Arbon, who was a rancher himself, further testified that 
cattle have a tendency to roam, and that therefore the steer did 
not necessarily escape from the pasture closest to the accident 
site. Id. This testimony was unrebutted by Wilcock or any other 
witness or evidence. 
Wilcock testified that he drove cattle directly through 
the culvert every year and that the fence had "always been saggy 
through there." Tr. 323-24. Similarly, Arbon testified that 
UDOT had dumped fill into the gap several times a year for many 
years. Tr. 137-39. There was no evidence, however, that any 
cattle had ever previously jumped the culvert fence or escaped 
through the gap underneath the fence. To the contrary, Arbon 
testified that only one steer had previously escaped in the 
vicinity of the accident. That escape occurred when a portion of 
the fence had been taken down by power company employees working 
in the area. Tr. 206. 
In addition, Burt, Suhr's cattle expert, repeatedly 
stated that when cattle are boxed in and spooked, they not only 
will jump a 36 inch fence but will sometimes go over even the top 
of a person. Tr. 362, 365. This testimony supported that of 
Arbon that he had seen cattle jump a fence as high as five feet. 
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Tr. 162-63. Burt also declined to opine that the steer jumped 
the fence in the area of the culvert, stating, "I don't know how 
I could say it jumped out at that spot. I've watched cattle all 
my life. They don't particularly pick any spot. They can get 
out at the most unlikely places." Tr. 364. Pressed further, 
Burt asked candidly, "Who knows where it got out?" Tr. 366. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, UDOT moved 
for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a), U. R. Civ. P., based on 
the insufficiency of the evidence to show that the steer had 
escaped through, and thus the accident was caused by, either of 
the two alleged defects. Tr. 544. The court denied the motion. 
Tr. 563. 
By special verdict, the jury found that UDOT was 
negligent as alleged by Suhr and that the negligence proximately 
caused Suhr to sustain injuries. The jury also found that Suhr 
was 15% contributorily negligent. The jury found special damages 
of $83,860 and general damages of $50,000, for a total of 
$133,860. After deducting for the contributory negligence and 
adding pre-judgment interest and costs, the court entered a 
judgment on the verdict for $118,814.70. 
UDOT moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
under Rule 50(b), U. R. Civ. P., again based on the insufficiency 
of the evidence to support the jury's finding that UDOT's claimed 
negligence proximately caused Suhr's injuries. R. 338. The 
court denied the motion. R. 402. 
8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Viewed in the light most favorable to Suhr, the 
evidence adduced at trial failed to support Suhr's theory that 
the steer had been in the pasture on the northbound side of the 
highway and that it escaped through either one of the two alleged 
defects in the fence bordering that side of the highway. Thus, 
Suhr failed to prove an essential element of his claim, i.e., 
that the alleged negligence of UDOT in maintaining the fence 
actually caused the accident. 
There was no direct evidence adduced at trial as to how 
or where the steer actually entered the highway. The 
circumstantial evidence was, at most, equally consistent with the 
view that the steer entered the highway from some other pasture 
or through some other means as that it escaped through either of 
the allegedly defective areas in the fence. Thus, the evidence 
established mere possibilities as to how the steer escaped and 
Suhr's theory of causation was based on complete speculation and 
conjecture. The judgment and jury verdict should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT SUHR'S THEORY THAT THERE 
WAS A CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 
ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE AND THE ACCIDENT 
An essential element of a cause of action in negligence 
is causation. Reeves v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991); 
Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985); Gregory v. 
Fourthwest Investments Ltd.. 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988). 
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Thus, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, 
not only that the defendant was negligent in a manner that could 
have injured the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was injured, 
but that the proven negligence was both the actual and proximate 
cause of the injury. Here, although reasonable persons might 
have differed as to whether UDOT was negligent in maintaining the 
fence that bordered the highway where the accident occurred, 
there was insufficient evidence to support Suhr's theory that the 
steer entered the highway as a result of the alleged negligence. 
Thus, Suhr failed to prove the essential connection between the 
alleged negligence of UDOT and his injury. 
A. At Most. The Evidence Was Equally Consistent With 
Other Explanations As The Theory That The Alleged 
Negligence Caused The Accident 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of causation 
in the context of a vehicle-animal collision in Rhiness v. 
Dansie, 472 P.2d 428 (Utah 1970). There, the plaintiff's car hit 
one of several of the defendant's horses that had escaped onto 
the highway. The horses were normally kept in a pasture next to 
a railroad track adjoining the highway. The pasture was 
separated from the track and the highway by a fence which had a 
gate, which was partially open at the time of the collision. The 
plaintiff contended that the defendant was negligent in failing 
to put a lock on the gate to prevent others who used the gate 
from leaving it open. 
Noting that the evidence showed that livestock had 
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escaped from the pasture four times in the 25 years before the 
accident, but never before through the gate, the Supreme Court 
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant. In so holding, 
the Court stated, "The mere fact that the animals escaped from 
the enclosure is not sufficient evidence, standing alone, to 
justify the submission of defendant's negligence to the jury." 
Id. 
The principle followed in Rhiness also governs this 
case. Like the plaintiff in Rhiness. Suhr adduced evidence at 
trial of a defect or defects in the fence t: ring the highway 
through which livestock could have escaped. As in Rhiness. 
however, there was simply no evidence that the animal actually 
escaped through the allegedly defective areas. Indeed, the 
evidence here is even weaker than in Rhiness. where the alleged 
defect was an unlocked and open gate which the horse would not 
have had to jump over or wriggle under to traverse. In the face 
of other possible explanations for the horses' escape, the 
Supreme Court in Rhiness rejected the plaintiff's theory as to 
causation. Similarly, Suhr's hypothesis should be rejected here. 
Rhiness was followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit in Vanderwater v. Hatch. 835 F.2d 239 (10th 
Cir. 1987). Vanderwater involved a collision between a 
motorcycle and a cow on a "stretch of rural highway in Northern 
Utah adjacent to a fenced past ff in which Hatch kept 25 head of 
yearling cows. Hatch also kept 120 head of cattle, including a 
few yearlings, on an open range that crossed the highway within a 
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mile of the accident site. Witnesses to the accident reported 
seeing as many as 15 yearlings on the highway just before the 
accident. Unlike Rhiness. however, there was no evidence of any 
defects in the pasture fence. 
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the 
trial court erred in denying a request for a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction, holding that the requirement that the injury was 
more probably than not the result of negligence was not met. 
"The evidence in the instant case is at least as consistent with 
the view that the cow involved in the accident drifted in from 
open range as with the view that it escaped from defendant's 
fenced pasture. In light of the statutory exclusion [exempting 
open range livestock from the requirement that owners prevent 
livestock from entering upon a fenced public highway], we do not 
believe there is a reasonable basis here for concluding the 
injury is more likely than not the result of negligence." Id. at 
242-43. 
In so holding, the court relied on Rhiness. While it 
did not directly address the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and 
was factually distinguishable, the court stated, "Rhiness at 
least implicitly rejects the proposition plaintiff Vanderwater is 
advancing in the instant case, that common knowledge is a 
sufficient substitute for evidence identifying the cause of the 
animals' escape." 
Although Vanderwater arose in the context of a request 
for a res ipsa loquitur instruction, its reasoning is helpful 
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here. As in Vanderwater. the evidence here is at least as 
consistent with the view that the steer entered the freeway 
through some other means as that it entered as a result of the 
defendant's negligence. The additional evidence of negligence 
adduced by Suhr adds nothing to his claim in the absence of 
evidence of causation. Just as the evidence did not warrant a 
legal -resumption of negligence in Vanderwater. it does not 
support a factual inference of causation here. See also Dailey 
v. Lawson. 119 A.2d 684, 685 (Vt. 1956) (reversing judgment upon 
: -y veri.'ct for the plaintiff stating, "The mere fact of the 
poor condition of the fence would not warrant a finding by the 
jury that the hose escaped over or through that portion of the 
fence"); Granger v. Tremblay. 28 A.2d 696, 697 (Vt. 1942) 
(reversing judgment upon a jury verdict for the plaintiff because 
there was "no evidence tending to show how the horse happened to 
be upon the highway" although the evidence did show that a gate 
to a pasture adjacent to the highway containing ether horses 
owned by the defendant was open). 
The Utah Supreme Court has applied this reasoning in 
other contexts as well. In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 
P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), for example, the Court upheld a summary 
judgment for the defendant, in whose hotel the plaintiff's 
decedent was robbed and murdered. The plaintiffs in Mitchell had 
adduced extensive evidence of numerous breaches in the hotel's 
security that could have allowed a potential assailant access to 
the victim's room where the murder took place. The Court found 
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that "plaintiffs have elicited sufficient evidence . . . to raise 
material issues of fact with respect to whether defendants were 
negligent in providing hotel security." But, the Court 
continued, 
the inquiry does not end there. 
Demonstrating material issues of fact with 
respect to defendants' negligence is not 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment if 
there is no evidence that establishes a 
direct causal connection between that alleged 
negligence and the injury. 
The Court noted the total absence of eyewitness or other direct 
evidence as how the murderer actually gained access to Mitchell's 
room. It concluded that the evidence was equally consistent with 
the view that the murderer entered the room at Mitchell's 
invitation as that the murderer obtained a passkey as a result of 
the hotel's lax security. "Any supposition," the Court stated, 
"as to the manner of entrance to Mitchell's room or the identity 
of the assailant would be totally speculative. A jury cannot be 
permitted to engage in such speculation." 
Similarly, in Staheli v. Farmers Cooperative of 
Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 1982), the Court upheld a 
judgment for the operator of a storage facility in which a fire 
broke out, destroying the plaintiff's grain. The plaintiff 
presented no evidence of the actual origin of the fire, relying 
on a presumption that a loss of or damages to bailed goods is due 
to the bailee's negligence. The Court affirmed the trial court's 
ruling that the defendant did not have exclusive control over the 
storage facility and that therefore there was no legal 
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presumption that the fire occurred as a result of the defendant's 
negligence. Moreover, although there was considerable evidence 
of conduct by the defendant that could have caused the fire, 
there was no evidence as to how the fire actually started. The 
Court stated, flWe readily concede that the record contains 
evidence of carelessness on the Coop's part, but there is also 
evidence of the Stahelis' negligence and, indeed, the possibility 
of negligence on the part of third parties.11 Concluding that the 
judgment should be affirmed, the Court stated, "When the 
proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim 
fails as a matter of law." See also Sumsion v. Strcator-Smith 
Inc.. 103 Utah 44, 52, 132 P.2d 680, (1943) (J. Wolfe) 
("While deductions may be based on probabilities, the evidence 
must do more than merely raise a conjecture or show a 
probability. Where there are probabilities the other way equally 
. ::.ore potent the deductions are mere guesses and the jury 
should not be permitted to speculate."). 
Just as there was no direct evidence as to how the 
murderer gained access to the victim's room in Mitchell or how 
the fire was started in Staheli, there was no direct evidence as 
to how or where the steer entered the highway in this case. The 
only witness to the accident was Suhr himself, who testified that 
when he first saw the steer it was simply standing in the outside 
lane of the highway. Tr. 380. Just as there was no known 
eyewitness to the murder in Rhiness or to the fire in Staheli. 
there was no eyewitness to the steer's entry onto the freeway 
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here. 
Moreover, as in Mitchell and Staheli. the evidence 
relied upon by Suhr is equally consistent with other possible 
explanations of the accident. To conclude that the cause of the 
accident was UDOT's alleged negligence would require utter 
speculation and conjecture. 
In closing argument, Suhr argued that Wilcock's 
testimony that the fence in the area of the gap was bent out 
constituted circumstantial evidence from which the jury could 
infer that the steer escaped through the gap. Tr. 649. Notably 
absent from Wilcock's testimony, however, was any claim that the 
fence was unbent before the accident. In light of Wilcock's 
statement that cattle liked to rub their necks there, Tr. 335, no 
inference that the fence was previously unbent can reasonably be 
drawn. Thus, even viewed in the light most favorable to Suhr, 
the evidence does not fairly or reasonably support the inference 
that the steer escaped through the gap. 
Suhr offered various explanations for the absence of 
any affirmative evidence of where or how the steer escaped. For 
example, he contended that the ground surface was too dry for the 
steer to have left any tracks and that the fence immediately 
above the gap was to smooth to scratch the steer's hide or catch 
its hair. Tr. 649. While it may have been within the jury's 
prerogative to accept these explanations, the evidence 
nevertheless failed to support Suhr's theory that the steer 
actually did escape through one of the defective areas. 
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Focusing on the possibility that the steer jumped the 
shortened fence in the area of the culvert, Suhr attempted in 
closing argument to paint a "picture" of the steer trapped in the 
culvert at near dark with semis "racing back and forth over the 
tunnel at 60 miles an hour." Tr. 653-56. While it may have 
provided compelling drama, this explanation of how and where the 
steer escaped was completely unsupported by any evidence. 
Indeed, the fact that trucks had been passing over the culvert 
and that the fence had been in the same condition for years, as 
Wilcock testified, Tr. 323-24, tended to refute this explanation. 
Moreover, even assuming that the conditions necessary 
to cause a steer to jump the fence, as established by Suhr's 
cattle expert, were in fact present, there was no evidence 
tending to show that the shortened height of the fence had any 
causal connection to the steer's escape. To the contrary, 
Clinton Burt testified that a steer the age and size of the one 
involved in the collision was capable not only of jumping a three 
foot fence, but "sometimes it might even be me" or "anybody else 
thci~ is there." Tr. 362, 365. In the same vein, Rodney Arbon 
testified that he had seen cattle jump a fence as high as five 
feet. Tr. 162-63. Arbon further testified that there was 
another culvert going underneath the freeway (thus also providing 
the conditions that Suhr contended caused the steer to jump) only 
one mile up the road. Tr. 172. Certainly, if the steer could 
have jumped over a person, there is no basis for concluding that 
the shortened area of fence was the cause in fact of the steer's 
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escape, even assuming the existence of conditions sufficient to 
cause a steer to leap over a fence in the first place. 
Realizing this flaw in his theory after the defendant's 
closing argument, Suhr made a last minute pitch in rebuttal that 
if steers can jump five foot fences and the state erects 4'4" 
fences, then n[i]f that isn't negligence I don't know what is," 
Tr. 681. Since Suhr adduced no evidence of any prior escapes 
over 4'4" fences or of the likelihood that a steer will jump such 
a fence, there was no competent evidence on which the jury could 
have based such a finding of negligence. Moreover, just as the 
evidence was insufficient to support Suhr's other theories as to 
how the steer escaped, it was insufficient to show that the steer 
actually did jump the 4'4" fence. 
Not only was there insufficient evidence to support 
Suhr's theory that the steer escaped through one of the two 
allegedly defective areas in the fence bordering the pasture on 
the northbound side of the highway, there was insufficient 
evidence to support the conclusion that the steer was even in 
that pasture before its escape. Notably absent from the 
testimony of Tom Wilcock, the owner of the steer, was any claim 
that the steer had indeed been enclosed in the pasture on the 
northbound side of the highway. At the same time, Arbon 
testified that Wilcock had cattle in two other pastures in the 
same vicinity at the time of the accident and that cattle have a 
habit of roaming. Tr. 170-75. While, again, it may have been 
within the jury's prerogative to disregard Arbon's testimony, the 
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evidence nevertheless failed to establish the steer's whereabouts 
before its escape. 
In closing, Suhr's counsel argued that both Arbon and 
Trooper Stephens had checked the fence "up and down the 
interstate" and found n[e]verything else in great shape," 
implying that the two allegedly defective areas were the only 
possibilities. Tr. 683. Of course, this argument ignores the 
fact that neither Arbon nor Stephens viewed either of the two 
allegedly defective areas as potential escape routes either. 
Even so, the testimony of Arbon and Stephens established only 
t rhere were no other defects in rhe fence within about a mile 
ot Lhe ^-cident site. It did not diminish the possibility that 
the steer escaped through some other means (e.g., by jumping the 
standard height fence) or that it escaped further up or down the 
road from one of Wilcock's other pastures. 
As shown by Rhiness. Vanderwater. Mitchell and Staheli, 
the essential causal link between the negligence and the injury 
cannot be reasonably inferred by the existence of the injury and 
the defect alone. There must be some additional evidence, either 
direct or circumstantial, to support the conclusion that the 
negligence in fact caused the injury. Suhr failed to adduce any 
such evidence and therefore the judgment and jury verdict must be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Suhr failed to adduce any evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, that established more than a mere possibility 
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that the steer escaped from the pasture on the northbound side of 
the highway adjacent to the accident site or through either one 
of the two allegedly defective areas in the fence bordering that 
pasture. At least equally likely was the possibility that the 
steer escaped from some other pasture or through some other means 
not attributable to UDOT. Thus, Suhr's theory of causation was 
based on complete speculation and conjecture, and the judgment 
and jury verdict should therefore be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ daY o f June, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attoasney General 
t[m 
DEBRA J.LMDORE 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
BEN H. HADFIELD 
Mann, Hadfield & Thome 
98 No. Main Street 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
this /<? day of June, 1992. 
M/«AL twu. 
20 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM 1 
Ben H. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield t Thome #1288 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building - 98 North Main 
P. 0. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BOX 
ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL H- SUHR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT 
Civil No. 900000191PI 
Judge F. L. Gunnel1 
Trial in the above matter came on regularly before the court 
on the 17th day of December, 1991. The plaintiff appeared 
personally and was represented by his attorneys Ben H. Hadfield 
and Jeff R Thome; defendant State of Utah by its Department of 
Transportation appeared and was represented by its attorney, Mark 
Ward. A jury of eight people was regularly empaneled and sworn 
t- try said action. Witnesses on the part of plaintiff and 
defendant were sworn and examined, and all evidence was submitted 
by the parties. After four days of trial and having considered 
the evidence, arguments of counsel and instructions of the court, 
case .* cf?rmicu 
a-v?/ 
Suhr vs. State of Utah 
Judgment on Verdict 
the jury retired to consider the verdict, and after deliberating 
approximately four and one-half hours, returned its special 
verdict and answered the interrogatories as follows: 
1. Was defendant State of Utah negligent as 
alleged? Answer: Yes 
2. If defendant State of Utah was negligent 
as alleged, did such negligence 
proximately cause the plaintiff, Michael 
H. Suhr to sustain injuries? Answer: Yes 
3. Was the livestock owner or operator 
negligent as alleged? Answer: No 
5. Was plaintiff Michael H. Suhr negligent 
as alleged? Answer: Yes 
6. If plaintiff Michael H. Suhr was 
negligent as alleged, did such negligence 
proximately cause the plaintiff Michael 
H. Suhr to sustain injuries: Answer: Yes 
7. Assuming the combined negligence of all 
parties is equal to 100%, what percentage 
is attributable to: 
A. State of Utah 85% 
B. Livestock owner or operator 0% 
C. Michael H. Suhr 15% 
100% 
8. What amounts, if any, would compensate 
plaintiff for his damages, if any, which he 
sustained as a result of the accident? 
A. Property Damages. 
1. Damage to truck $ 4,000.00 
2. Towing Charges $ 1,200.00 
2 
Suhr vs. State of Utah 
Judgment on Verdict 
B. Special Damages. 
1. Past medical expenses $ 5,100.00 
2. Past lost earnings $ 8,560.00 
3. Future medical expenses $ 15,000.00 
4. Future loss of earnings $ 50,000.00 
5. Future loss of household 
services -0-
TOTAL PROPERTY AND SPECIAL 
DAMAGES $ 83,860.00 
C. General Damages $ 50,000.00 
TOTAL VERDICT $133.860.00 
Pursuant to Section 78-27-44, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest at the 
rate of 10% per annum from the date of the accident on 
$18,860.00, the amount of all special damages incurred to the 
date of trial. This interest totals $5,922.00 as of December 30, 
1991, which amount should be added to the judgment, for a total 
judgment of $139,782.00. Pursuant to Utah law regarding 
comparative fault, the total judgment should be reduced by 15%, 
the amount of plaintiff's comparative fault, which is equal to 
$20,967.30. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORI J5D, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that plaintiff Michael H. Suhr shall have judgment 
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fiuhr vs. State of Utah 
Judgment on Verdict 
against the State of Utah for the total amount of $118,814.70. 
In addition, plaintiff shall be awarded his costs pursuant to 
Rule 54(d) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This judgment shall 
bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date hereof. 
DATED this lp day of -©eeemSeT/y 19MT. 
BY THE COURT; 
F. L. GUNNELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE QF MAIMPG 
In accordance with Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, a copy of the within Judgment on the Verdict was 
mailed to defendant's attorney, Mark Ward, Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
by depositing in the United States mail, postage prepaid, a copy 
of said proposed Judgment on the Verdict, on the a>''W\ day of 
December, 1991. 
tr/1:suhr.jud 
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Jan 3 l l s i M i ^ Z 
Ben H. Hadfield of Mann, Hadfield & Thome, #1288 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main 
P. O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone 723-3404 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL H. SUHR, ) 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
vs. ) THE VERDICT 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION, STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendants. ) Civil No. 900000191 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the 
defendant's Motion filed in accordance with 50(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant submitted a supporting 
Memorandum, a Memorandum in Opposition was filed by the 
plaintiff, and a Reply Memorandum was filed by the defendant. The 
Court reviewed these documents prior to the hearing which was 
held on January 8, 1992, beginning at 10:00 o'clock a.m. At said 
time, the plaintiff was represented by Ben H. Hadfield of Mann, 
Hadfield and Thorne and the defendant, State of Utah, was 
represented by J. Mark Hard, Assistant Attorney General. The 
Court heard arguments from each counsel concerning the Motion for 
M I C R O F I L M E D 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and then issued its decision 
from the bench. 
In its ruling, the Court noted that the issue was whether 
there was sufficient evidence that was placed before the jury to 
satisfy it by preponderance of the evidence that there was in 
fact negligence, that there was in fact causation, and that there 
were in fact damages. The Court observed that there were 
sufficient instructions on causation to assist the jury in 
understanding what the Court expected them to find before they 
could make a finding of liability. There were specifically three 
separate jury instructions defining and explaining proximate 
cause. The Court is satisfied that the jurors reviewed those 
instructions and applied those against the evidence. The Court 
is of the opinion that the jury understood that there had to be a 
relationship of causation and negligence on the part of the 
State. The Court is further of the opinion that the Court must 
now consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
verdict. 
Under these circumstances, the Court finds that there is 
sufficient evidence to show to the satisfaction of a jury, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the damages were proximately 
caused by defendant's negligence. The Court conferred with the 
jurors after the trial had been concluded. The jurors noted that 
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while there was testimony that the steer could have walked over 
the fence in one location and crawled under the fence at another 
location, the fact that the steer was hit in the immediate 
vicinity, very close to the defects in the fence, added more 
weight to the fact that the steer, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, got over or under the fence at those locations where 
there was negligence. This then relates to the proximate cause 
question. This Court is of the opinion that there was sufficient 
evidence for the jury to find as it did. The defendant's Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict .: denied. 
DATED this ^y,l day of January, 1992. 
F. L. GUNNELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ff day of January, 1992, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Judgment 
Notwithstanding Verdict to J. Mark Ward, Attorney for Defendant, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Secretary ^ ' 
pj/2:»iiir.ord 
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